Wednesday, July 1, 2020

Military Machismo and the Collapse of the Imperial French Army in 1870


The cream of the regular French Army was captured in the first few months of the Franco-Prussian War, either at the debacle of Sedan or virtually in the surrounded fortress of Metz. Most accounts lay all the blame to incompetent French generalship. While Napoleon III was quite guilty and it trickled on down, there is more to the tale. Most accounts tell of the chaotic French mobilization. Then the French deploy at the frontier, the battles commence and we assume the problems of the mobilization are done and gone. But they continued to plague the French, something glossed over in most accounts and ignored by most gamers.

All internet images removed from this post, sorry.


An item caught my eye some years back while re-reading Howard’s “The Franco-Prussian War”. French troops deployed near the border were going through the streets of nearby towns begging for food. This indicated a serious problem. Then Wawro’s account of the war noted that French troops of the I Corps were told to fill their knapsacks or saddle bags with any supplies from the railroad trains before moving up to the front. French troops were going hungry in their own country, before hostilities began.

The chaotic mobilization can be largely attributed to the machismo culture of the French Army. Staff officers were looked down upon as military clerks and time-servers. Organizations widely deemed incompetent tend to attract those types.  French officer Ardant du Picq’s writings are immersed in his front-line experience without a word on staff work.

The usual tale of the bungled mobilization tells of recruits riding trains hither and yon across France before finally reaching their destinations. This must have had unfortunate effects on morale. But there was worse. Adriance’s “To the Last Gaiter Button” tells the story of how the bungled mobilization continued to plague the French for critical weeks after.

In comparison the Prussian mobilization looks like a well-oiled machine. It was not without errors, but it functioned.  Officers in the Prussian general staff served some years on the staff and then rotated into the line for some years. There might be friction but line and staff knew each other. Staff officers had meetings with civilian railroad executives from time to time long before war broke out. They discussed plans and again knew each other. Prussian railcars had bills of lading attached to their exteriors, in transparent waterproof covers. These mundane details aided victory. More to the point, ignoring them opened the door to defeat.

The French Army had been fitting out expeditions to invade and create colonies in North Africa and other places. Sending a division or two always involved a lot of improvisation. This had been dignified with the term “se debrouillier”, loosely translated as “we’ll muddle through somehow”. It was further mockingly noted as “le Systeme De”, or System D. Last minute planning sufficed for forces of 20-40,000 troops being sent against tribal enemies. Improvisation would be found woefully lacking for deploying a quarter million troops and their equipment against the Prussians. Mobilization weaknesses had been detected in the 1859 war against Austria, but were ignored after the French managed to defeat the hapless foe. The Prussians looked through their 1866 win against the same enemy and corrected mistakes.

Why were French troops begging for food in the streets of their own towns? French farmers could grow enough food. French railroads could provide enough trains. The French General Staff’s improvisation could not load those trains properly or unload all the equipment that was forwarded.

Orders of battle for this period show French units weaker than Prussian ones. They actually had similar strengths but the flawed build-up could not deliver full strength units to the front. The railroads provided enough cars for 1,000 strong battalions but the staff was unable to coordinate all troops being present at loading times. This resulted in trains that could hold 1,000 being sent to the front with 750 troops. Priority was given to combat troops. Horse drawn supply wagons and teams waited for later trains. In most cases, that meant they did not arrive at all before combat broke out. Understrength units were deposited at the front without their supply wagons. Once they marched away from the railhead, they had no more food or ammunition than they carried. That is why the troops begged for food in the streets. Each French unit commander was dealing with an existential crisis before the enemy came within view. This would have been of little importance if the Prussians gave them time to recover. But the enemy did not. This also helps explain the inability of French Corps to come to each other's aid during the frontier battles. They were immobilized by lack of supplies.

What supplies were forwarded were not loaded by a uniform system. They did not have a bill of lading. The only way to know what a car contained was to unload it. When Metz finally fell, the rail sidings had 30,000 cars loaded with mystery cargo. Mundane mistakes like this, the indecision of Napoleon III and the basic functionality of the Prussians combined to bring the Second Empire down.

The Republic didn’t have a miraculous improvement by the staff, but the prolonged resistance of the garrison of Paris allowed them the time to assemble their poorly trained (but better led) armies. Later in the war when they attempted a lightning strike east with Bourbaki’s army, the mobilization was just as haywire, compounded by frigid winter weather. In addition to being poorly equipped and so late the element of surprise was lost, the troops were racked with illness.

The lesson was finally learned. Though the term “Systeme De” continued in use to describe the usual foul-ups in any large army, the French Army of 1914 was mobilized with full strength units that had their supply elements present. The staff was able to rapidly move an entire army by rail from the eastern wing to form the Sixth Army outside Paris. This derailed the German Schlieffen Plan, saving France. A large modern army needed its “clerks”, and those clerks needed to be as well trained and drilled as any combat troops.

8 comments:

uiduach OB said...

That, Vincent, was an education. Thank you.

Bhoritz said...

Whilst I certainly agree with your comparison between the french and german organisations and consequences, I don’t think that it is the result of a particular machismo. German had just pioneered a military revolution. That it was a revolution in organisation and general staff and not the appearance of a new weapon makes no difference. The change in command and military culture gave the german an edge on two points that proved decisive:
- the logistics, as you say, with a better use of railways by germans (whilst the french were sure to beat the german at speed mobilisation)
- a common thinking and initiative in the german army. All the early battles of the frontier look the same: the french, in good defensive position stop the germans with chassepot fire; the germans commanders march to the sound of the guns (whilst french wait for orders or worse) and the germans win.
I don’t think that the french were different or special compared with other european armies. They were quite good an experienced (though with smaller armies and rather in colonial wars). There was no « fault » in what they did. It was just that the german had invented a new way to make war.

Curmudgeon in Chief said...

Bhoritz, afraid you sound somewhat apoligistic for the French. While I agree it wasn't necessarily machismo, there was certainly, from my readings, a poorly organized officer corps throughout the French army, too much focus on attack versus defense despite their taking those defensive positions. But, of course, we are each entitled to our own views of history. My studies of this period only went far enough for me to back away from it - unless you count those colonial campaigns, those interest me from a gaming perspective.

C. von Grumpy said...

Thank you for sharing your thoughts on this sad episode of our History. The Germans are usually very ready when they go to war , we tend to say that the French army is always a War behind.

vtsaogames said...

The US version is to usually enter the war with a tiny regular army, recruiting and building up forces after hostilities have begun. This often involves early painful lessons.

ChrisBBB said...

Nice post, Vincent, thank you. Another factor in the French defeat was that much of the human materiel was past its "best before" date. Not just the generals who had won their first laurels in Algeria in the 1840s or in the Crimea in 1855, but also the long-serving regular soldiers in the ranks who may have been formidable once but had been ruined by a decade or more of French barracks life and too much wine. The German conscripts may have had fewer battle honours on their banners but were younger, fitter, stronger, healthier, hence outmarched the French armies as they chased them across France.

I had the honour of helping Prof Murray run a Froeschwiller wargame at the US Naval War College:
https://bloodybigbattles.blogspot.com/2017/01/wargaming-at-us-naval-war-college.html
Apart from these modern US military men being shocked by the sheer scale of the casualties (over 30,000), I believe one of them commented that 'this battle wasn't won on the battlefield' - i.e., it was won by German superiority in all the important respects leading up to it: efficient mobilization, efficient logistics, aggressive march-to-the-sound-of-the-guns doctrine, reconnaissance ...

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
https://groups.io/g/bloodybigbattles
https://www.facebook.com/groups/1412549408869331/

Unknown said...

Vincent:

Thank you for this - it is hard not to agree with your analysis. I am reminded also of the account in Henderson's book about Spicheren, where the retreating French did not have a meal for more than 24 hours, as a result of poor staff-work.

One point (of which you may well be aware): "Systeme D" is also sometimes translated with "se demerder" as the base, rather than "se debrouiller"! ;-)

Cheers,

A. Gregory

vtsaogames said...

Thanks Arofan, didn't know the other version of Systeme D.