The cream of the regular French Army was captured in the
first few months of the Franco-Prussian War, either at the debacle of Sedan or virtually in the surrounded fortress of Metz. Most accounts lay all the blame to incompetent
French generalship. While Napoleon III was quite guilty and it trickled on
down, there is more to the tale. Most accounts tell of the chaotic French
mobilization. Then the French deploy at the frontier, the battles commence and we assume
the problems of the mobilization are done and gone. But they continued to
plague the French, something glossed over in most accounts and ignored by most
gamers.
All internet images removed from this post, sorry.
An item caught my eye some years back while re-reading
Howard’s “The Franco-Prussian War”. French troops deployed near the border were
going through the streets of nearby towns begging for food. This indicated a
serious problem. Then Wawro’s account of the war noted that French troops of the
I Corps were told to fill their knapsacks or saddle bags with any supplies from
the railroad trains before moving up to the front. French troops were going
hungry in their own country, before hostilities began.
The chaotic mobilization can be largely attributed to the
machismo culture of the French Army. Staff officers were looked down upon as
military clerks and time-servers. Organizations widely deemed incompetent tend
to attract those types. French officer Ardant
du Picq’s writings are immersed in his front-line experience without a word on
staff work.
The usual tale of the bungled mobilization tells of recruits
riding trains hither and yon across France before finally reaching their
destinations. This must have had unfortunate effects on morale. But there was
worse. Adriance’s “To the Last Gaiter Button” tells the story of how the
bungled mobilization continued to plague the French for critical weeks after.
In comparison the Prussian mobilization looks like a well-oiled
machine. It was not without errors, but it functioned. Officers in the Prussian general staff served some
years on the staff and then rotated into the line for some years. There might
be friction but line and staff knew each other. Staff officers had meetings
with civilian railroad executives from time to time long before war broke out.
They discussed plans and again knew each other. Prussian railcars had bills of
lading attached to their exteriors, in transparent waterproof covers. These mundane
details aided victory. More to the point, ignoring them opened the door to
defeat.
The French Army had been fitting out expeditions to invade and
create colonies in North Africa and other places. Sending a division or two always
involved a lot of improvisation. This had been dignified with the term “se
debrouillier”, loosely translated as “we’ll muddle through somehow”. It was
further mockingly noted as “le Systeme De”, or System D. Last minute planning
sufficed for forces of 20-40,000 troops being sent against tribal enemies. Improvisation
would be found woefully lacking for deploying a quarter million troops and
their equipment against the Prussians. Mobilization weaknesses had been
detected in the 1859 war against Austria, but were ignored after the French
managed to defeat the hapless foe. The Prussians looked through their 1866 win
against the same enemy and corrected mistakes.
Why were French troops begging for food in the streets of
their own towns? French farmers could grow enough food. French railroads could
provide enough trains. The French General Staff’s improvisation could not load
those trains properly or unload all the equipment that was forwarded.
Orders of battle for this period show French units weaker
than Prussian ones. They actually had similar strengths but the flawed build-up
could not deliver full strength units to the front. The railroads provided
enough cars for 1,000 strong battalions but the staff was unable to coordinate
all troops being present at loading times. This resulted in trains that could
hold 1,000 being sent to the front with 750 troops. Priority was given to
combat troops. Horse drawn supply wagons and teams waited for later trains. In
most cases, that meant they did not arrive at all before combat broke out.
Understrength units were deposited at the front without their supply wagons.
Once they marched away from the railhead, they had no more food or ammunition
than they carried. That is why the troops begged for food
in the streets. Each French unit commander was dealing with an existential
crisis before the enemy came within view. This would have been of little importance
if the Prussians gave them time to recover. But the enemy did not. This also helps explain the inability of French Corps to come to each other's aid during the frontier battles. They were immobilized by lack of supplies.
What supplies were forwarded were not loaded by a uniform
system. They did not have a bill of lading. The only way to know what a car
contained was to unload it. When Metz finally fell, the rail sidings had 30,000
cars loaded with mystery cargo. Mundane mistakes like this, the indecision of
Napoleon III and the basic functionality of the Prussians combined to bring the
Second Empire down.
The Republic didn’t have a miraculous improvement by the
staff, but the prolonged resistance of the garrison of Paris allowed them the
time to assemble their poorly trained (but better led) armies. Later in the war
when they attempted a lightning strike east with Bourbaki’s army, the mobilization
was just as haywire, compounded by frigid winter weather. In addition to being
poorly equipped and so late the element of surprise was lost, the troops were
racked with illness.
The lesson was finally learned. Though the term “Systeme De”
continued in use to describe the usual foul-ups in any large army, the French
Army of 1914 was mobilized with full strength units that had their supply elements present. The staff was able to rapidly move an entire army by rail from the
eastern wing to form the Sixth Army outside Paris. This derailed the German Schlieffen
Plan, saving France. A large modern army needed its “clerks”, and those clerks
needed to be as well trained and drilled as any combat troops.
8 comments:
That, Vincent, was an education. Thank you.
Whilst I certainly agree with your comparison between the french and german organisations and consequences, I don’t think that it is the result of a particular machismo. German had just pioneered a military revolution. That it was a revolution in organisation and general staff and not the appearance of a new weapon makes no difference. The change in command and military culture gave the german an edge on two points that proved decisive:
- the logistics, as you say, with a better use of railways by germans (whilst the french were sure to beat the german at speed mobilisation)
- a common thinking and initiative in the german army. All the early battles of the frontier look the same: the french, in good defensive position stop the germans with chassepot fire; the germans commanders march to the sound of the guns (whilst french wait for orders or worse) and the germans win.
I don’t think that the french were different or special compared with other european armies. They were quite good an experienced (though with smaller armies and rather in colonial wars). There was no « fault » in what they did. It was just that the german had invented a new way to make war.
Bhoritz, afraid you sound somewhat apoligistic for the French. While I agree it wasn't necessarily machismo, there was certainly, from my readings, a poorly organized officer corps throughout the French army, too much focus on attack versus defense despite their taking those defensive positions. But, of course, we are each entitled to our own views of history. My studies of this period only went far enough for me to back away from it - unless you count those colonial campaigns, those interest me from a gaming perspective.
Thank you for sharing your thoughts on this sad episode of our History. The Germans are usually very ready when they go to war , we tend to say that the French army is always a War behind.
The US version is to usually enter the war with a tiny regular army, recruiting and building up forces after hostilities have begun. This often involves early painful lessons.
Nice post, Vincent, thank you. Another factor in the French defeat was that much of the human materiel was past its "best before" date. Not just the generals who had won their first laurels in Algeria in the 1840s or in the Crimea in 1855, but also the long-serving regular soldiers in the ranks who may have been formidable once but had been ruined by a decade or more of French barracks life and too much wine. The German conscripts may have had fewer battle honours on their banners but were younger, fitter, stronger, healthier, hence outmarched the French armies as they chased them across France.
I had the honour of helping Prof Murray run a Froeschwiller wargame at the US Naval War College:
https://bloodybigbattles.blogspot.com/2017/01/wargaming-at-us-naval-war-college.html
Apart from these modern US military men being shocked by the sheer scale of the casualties (over 30,000), I believe one of them commented that 'this battle wasn't won on the battlefield' - i.e., it was won by German superiority in all the important respects leading up to it: efficient mobilization, efficient logistics, aggressive march-to-the-sound-of-the-guns doctrine, reconnaissance ...
Chris
Bloody Big BATTLES!
https://groups.io/g/bloodybigbattles
https://www.facebook.com/groups/1412549408869331/
Vincent:
Thank you for this - it is hard not to agree with your analysis. I am reminded also of the account in Henderson's book about Spicheren, where the retreating French did not have a meal for more than 24 hours, as a result of poor staff-work.
One point (of which you may well be aware): "Systeme D" is also sometimes translated with "se demerder" as the base, rather than "se debrouiller"! ;-)
Cheers,
A. Gregory
Thanks Arofan, didn't know the other version of Systeme D.
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