A number of events conspired to keep us from playing a game last week. We shall see if another can be arranged next week. In the meantime, here’s a historical tidbit.
Lots
of us have played at least one version of the Battle of Waterloo. Unless the
game allows the decision to be reached before Blucher’s lads reach the field,
the Prussians show up and begin making Napoleon’s task harder.
We
often think of Wellington’s tactical finesse, giving not much thought to
Blucher aside from him cheering on his troops marching through the mud. Many of
our miniature rules count the tactical acumen of the leaders, Wellington
getting a big bonus, Blucher not so much. Have you considered the risks that
Blucher was taking in marching to Wellington’s aid?
Wellington
was facing Napoleon in person for the first time. He had noted Bonaparte frequently
threatened enemy supply lines, forcing them to retreat and then hitting them
when they were on the back foot. He worried about his supply lines to the coast
during the short campaign, leaving some 17,000 troops guarding his supply lines
at Hal on the day of the battle, troops that would have given him quite a
cushion at the desperate battle. Some of his Continental Allies, with experience
fighting against (and some for) Napoleon were aware that he also had a penchant
for getting between enemy forces and beating them in detail. Blucher had been
the victim of just such an attack in 1814. Rebounding, a month later he defeated
the Corsican at Laon.
Wellington
had told Blucher he would fight at Waterloo if Blucher promised to come to his
aid with one corps of his army. Blucher marched with 3 of the 4 corps
in his army. While he did so, he left the fourth corps covering his line of
supply (and escape) fighting against a much larger French force under Marshal
Grouchy. When that Corps commander cried for help, Blucher said the decision
was at Waterloo; the fellow must look to his own forces for help.
I
cannot imagine Wellington, brilliant tactician that he was, ignoring a serious
attack on his lines of supply/retreat.
Blucher
had a track record of ignoring threats to his rear. The battle of Leipzig,
which ended Napoleon’s 1813 campaign in disaster, kicking the French out of
Germany, resulted from Blucher’s gutsiness. Napoleon was frustrated by the
Trachenberg plan, where an Allied army facing him in person would give ground,
but those facing his subordinates would attack. It was like the school yard
game where the victim’s hat is grabbed and tossed back and forth to other kids
as the victim tries to reclaim it. Napoleon might win a victory at Dresden, for
example, only to find that his subordinates had been defeated at the Katzbach,
Gross Beeren and Kulm.
Unable
to force Blucher to fight him in person, Napoleon lunged around Blucher’s
southern flank. Instead of falling back to the east into the trap, the wily 70
year old Prussian headed northwest, forcing Bernadotte to share supplies with him.
He also goaded the nervous Bernadotte into advancing in support of him. This
led to the final showdown at Leipzig, where the French were outnumbered better
than 3 to 2 and nearly totally encircled. Blucher was aggressive, but otherwise
an indifferent tactician. His operational moxie and guts set the stage for one
of Napoleon’s greatest defeats.
Blucher also set the stage for the decisive final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte. Defeated (and
nearly captured) at the Battle of Ligny on June 16, 1815, he and his army fell
back to the north, keeping within supporting distance of Wellington, who also retired
in step. Some 10,000 young recruits, shaken loose during the twilight retreat,
fell back east towards home. Enough of them, in fact, to fool the pursuing
French under Grouchy into believing that the main army had retreated that way. The pursuing
French lost much of the next day following the wrong group.
As
an aside, I’m nearly the age Blucher was at this battle. If thrown from a dying
horse and having enemy cavalry pass over my position twice at speed, I’m not
sure how much fight I’d have left in me.
Assured
of support, Wellington made his stand on the slopes of Mont St. Jean. Blucher
then ignored the immediate threat to his rear as Thielemann’s III Corps fought
against nearly two-to-one odds at Wavre. Focused on the defeat of Napoleon’s
main army, he ignored the sound of the struggle in his rear, arriving at the
main battle in time for the combined Allied armies to hand the French a crushing
blow.
I’ve
read accounts online from some gamers who apparently got their knowledge of the
battle from movies. They believe that Wellington’s army defeated the French
single-handed and the Prussians showed up in time to pursue the French. This
version doesn’t explain the 7,500 Prussian casualties at the battle. Perhaps
they tripped over their own shoelaces during the pursuit? It does mean the filmmakers
got to save money by not having to produce many Prussian uniforms, while
simplifying the script.
Plancenoit
The
Prussians showed up in strength from 4:30 on in growing numbers. The village of
Plancenoit in the French right rear changed hands 5 times during the battle. At
the critical moment Ney captured the key to Wellington’s center and asked for
more troops. Napoleon turned down the request; he was busy organizing the
second (and last) French counter-attack on the village in the French rear.
Later, he found some Imperial Guards to send in. By this time Wellington had
managed some repairs to his sagging center. The attack failed, the Guards were routed.
Wellington’s
army did not fight all of Napoleon’s 72,000. The Prussians put about 49,000 troops
in combat before the battle ended. The French sent at least 15,000 to hold them
off. Wellington’s 68,000 were pressed to the limit by some 57,000 French. Wellington
called it a close run thing.
It
was a good thing for the Allies that the French made the mistakes they did.
First among them was Napoleon assuming that Blucher was down for the count. He
had defeated him before. He should have recalled that Blucher was not in the habit
of staying defeated for long.
In
our games we consider the tactical acumen of generals. Not surprising, since
our table-top battles are tactical exercises. But the operational skill of our
leaders is not considered. I guess we need to have playable operational games
for that. Some of you say we do. The ones I’ve seen are too complex and too
time-consuming. At this point in my life, I prefer a simpler game that doesn’t
take as many hours.
And
that’s it for now. Hopefully in a week or two there will be another report of
Late Romans vs. the hairy barbarians.
