I’ve been re-reading this fine book. A second read often reveals new insights passed over the first time around. The author, Richard Overy posits that Allied victory was not inevitable, as production numbers and such by the end of the war seem to indicate.
Critical turning points occurred early, when the advantage and momentum was on
the side of the Axis.
The awakening of American
industry had not yet begun to be felt when the cream of the Japanese Navy air
arm was destroyed during the Battle of Midway. Hard work by the cryptographers
in Pearl Harbor, precise planning by the US Navy, valiant, sometimes suicidal
bravery by the US aircrews and finally astounding luck smashed 4 Japanese fleet
carriers. The startling 6-month run of Japanese victories came to an abrupt,
bloody halt. They would be on the strategic defensive for the rest of the Pacific
naval war.
The Battle of the Atlantic reached
a turning point by May 1943. The defeat of the U-boats was the result of a
number of things happening at the same time. The superior tactics and training
instituted by submariner Admiral Horton of the Royal Navy, improved radar,
increased air support and a breakthrough reading German radio messages while
finally encrypting Allied radio securely all led to a stunning turn-around in May.
Not long before, the Germans had been causing enormous losses, in one case
meeting a pair of convoys with 36 U-boats, sinking 21 ships for the loss of one
boat. Then all the events combined for such a deadly month that all surviving
U-boats were called to port and did not venture out again until the German high
command analyzed the disaster. They would come out again, but never regained
their threat. The Allies could ship troops and supplies across the Atlantic, paving
the way for amphibious invasions that would climax in D-Day.
The Red Army managed to stop the
winter offensive against Moscow despite having lost some 4 million soldiers,
8,000 aircraft and 17,000 tanks (half of them due to breakdown). The population
rallied, making good the losses in troops and equipment, leading to the
stunning victory of Stalingrad in late 1942-early 1943.
Germany produced less armaments than
the Allies. Much of this can be laid to poor decisions by the Axis. The Soviets
produced way more tanks, planes and guns than the Germans, with a quarter of
the steel. It is true that the well-designed and rather poorly fabricated T-34
tanks were not the equal of the later war Panther and Tiger tanks. The Soviet
tanks were mass-produced in large numbers while the German tanks were more artisanal
products, very nicely produced but in much smaller numbers. Chalk that up to Nazi
inefficiency at the highest level, combined with unrealistic requirements of
the Wehrmacht high command. Panzer General Guderian told Armaments Minister
Speer that what he wanted was T-34 tanks. Instead, after lengthy delays, he got
Panthers and Tigers in smaller numbers, with early teething problems that led
to breakdowns. By the time they were available in moderate numbers fuel was in
short supply. And the Tigers were limited because not many bridges could bear
the weight.
At the critical mid-war period, the Axis was out-thought, sometimes out-fought and out-produced. And I’m not done reading about Stalingrad yet.
