Tuesday, September 8, 2026

Book Review: The Crimean War, by Orlando Figes

By the time the French and British armies, on a mission to rescue the Ottomans from Russian invasion, had arrived in the eastern Mediterranean theater, the Russians had retreated from the Danube valley. The Allies were disappointed.

 

The British had hoped to chastise the Russians; Napoleon III sought a brilliant victory to bolster his shaky domestic standing. Casting about for something to do, they decided to capture the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s base in Sevastopol. That’s why they went to the Crimea.

 

Over the years I read a number of books about the Crimean War, all Anglo-centric. And I wondered why the Russians had fallen back. My first book, The Destruction of Lord Raglan, by Christopher Hibbert, named the various problems facing the Russian commander. One item on the list of woe was “threatened by an ungrateful Austria”. Was this threat a strong letter to the Times? More on this later. The various problems afflicting commanders of the time were also listed, strong enemy resistance, supply problems, sickness endemic to armies before the discovery of germs, etc. The vague reference to an Austrian threat never got my attention. The plucky British, aided a little by the excitable French, dealt withering blows to the stolid, unimaginative masses of Russians. Fine writing, biased history.

 

Later, The Battle of the Alma, by Peter Gibbs, merely notes that the siege of Silistria (an Ottoman Danube fortress), was raised before any but a few adventurous British officers could arrive. Apparently, the besieging army just floated away. I wasn’t expecting much detail on the raising of the siege, and got none.

 

A third book whose title I have forgotten declared that those early British officers had led irregulars on raids of the Russian supply lines, causing the siege to be lifted. This was obvious hogwash. 60,000+ strong armies are not forced to retire by hit-and-run raids. A force seizing and holding a choke point on the supply line would be another story.

 

Then I found The Banner of Battle: the Crimean War Story, by Alan Palmer. This is less Anglo-centric than the previous three, and devoid of jingoism. It is primarily about diplomatic history. In it, I discovered that the Austrians, upset by Russian forces in the Danube valley, mobilized 100,000 troops, threatening the Russian flank. Ah, now there’s a reason for a large army to withdraw; a flank threat and yet another nation possibly entering the war against them. Finally, a credible reason the Russians retreated from the Danube.

 

The book tells of Florence Nightingale. Her humane modifications to hospital care didn’t reduce mortality at the hospital, as the water source was compromised. She learned from this and later greatly reduced mortality in London by cleaning up the water supply. Palmer does overstate the range advantage of Minie rifles over the smoothbore muskets that almost all Russian infantry carried. More on this in a bit. 

 

More recently I finally came upon a copy of The Crimean War by Orlando Figes. He is a scholar of Russian History, and includes the Russian point of view, missing from the previous works. He notes the extremely bad blood between Eastern Orthodox Christians and Catholics, not to mention Protestants. Blood had flowed before at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. As self-declared protector of Eastern Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire, Tsar Nicholas I seized upon the latest brawl to expand Russian territory at the expense of the declining Ottoman Empire. An absolute ruler for the last 29 years, unused to hearing things he didn’t like, he seems to have been flirting with pan-Slavism. The grand goal of this would see all the Slavic nations of the Balkans and Middle Europe bending the knee to Moscow, and the Orthodox Greeks too, who would be back in Constantinople. Over a prostrate Ottoman remanent. Heady stuff, no doubt.

 

The Austrian (Habsburg) Empire and the Russian (Romanov) Empire had been the backbone of the conservative Concert of Europe since 1815, being the two most conservative and economically backward states in Europe, bar the Ottomans. There had been the revolutionary upheaval of 1848-9, when the Habsburg dynasty had a near-death experience. The Hungarians had been successfully fighting for their independence when huge Russian armies invaded from Russian Poland, quashing Hungarian hopes. Nicholas assumed the Austrians owed him big-time for this.

 

But when the Russians invaded the Danube in 1853, Kaiser Franz Joseph was not pleased. He didn’t want expanded Russian power in his back yard and certainly didn’t want his Slavic subjects getting ideas about throwing off Habsburg rule. He not only mobilized a lot of troops, he gave Nicholas an ultimatum, threatening to join Britain, France and the Ottomans in the war. Now there’s a truly viable reason for that large Russian army to tuck tail and run. The “threat by an ungrateful Austria” was not a stern letter to the Times. The rupture between the two empires would still be in effect in 1914.

 

Figes also overstates the range advantage of Minie rifles over Russian smoothbores, quoting ranges over 1,000 yards. Current research by Paddy Griffith, Brent Nosworthy and Earl Hess maintains that in the hands of most soldiers, Minie rifles were effective at about 150 yards, still a serious advantage over the 75 yards of smoothbores. One of the 4 British infantry divisions was armed with smoothbores. Most of the French infantry save the Zouaves were armed with smoothbore muskets. I do believe that the standard Russian field formation of battalion columns 8 to 12 ranks deep was the wrong formation to meet Minie rifles in. Most soldiers fired high. The  curved Minie trajectories made a number of those high shots come down in the rear ranks. I think that’s one reason the Russian losses were so high in field battles. Specialist elite troops like the British Rifle Brigade or Berdan’s Sharpshooters of the later American Civil War were better prepared to take advantage of the longer ranges of Minie rifles. But the average 19th century soldier was not.

 

Figes has the Light Brigade defeat the Russian cavalry behind the Russian artillery at the end of the Valley of Death, although at too high a cost. The British bungled their supply arrangements at the siege of Sevastopol, while the French were moderately professional, shown by the different death rates. The Russians died in job lots under bombardment. But the Allies never cut the city’s supply lines, so fresh troops kept coming in.

 

The British cherished memories of the Thin Red Line, the Charge of the Light Brigade and the much more successful Charge of the Heavy Brigade. The French, after finally storming the city in 1855, got to name various streets, bridges and such in Paris (and subsequent Metro stops) after their battle places, Alma, Crimee, Sevastopol, Malakoff, etc. The Russians claimed Sevastopol as a secular icon, a shrine to Russian bravery, a place it occupies in their mythology today.

 

Figes explains how the sewage plumbing of the Scutari hospital leaked into the water source, defeating Florence Nightingale’s best efforts. A sorry thing.

 

The war lasted longer than any involved foresaw and been much more costly in blood and treasure. Bismarck’s wars of German Unification took center stage, putting Russian encroachment in the back seat. When France was humiliated in 1870-71, Russia disavowed the Crimean peace treaty and re-armed Sevastopol.

 

When Russia next went to war against the Ottomans in 1877, Britain’s attention was fixed on the new German Empire, France was still reeling from their recent defeat, as were the Austrians, who were assuming their position as Germany’s lap dog. The newly unified Italy had gained much of what they wanted from their alliances, first with France and then with Prussia.

 

Franz Joseph helmed Austria through the humiliating defeat of 1866 and into World War One before exiting the world stage.

 

Nicholas died during the war, largely un-mourned. A long-time autocrat, with a rather mystical attachment to pan-Slavism, he got the nation into an unsuccessful war against 4 nations (Piedmont/Sardinia later joined up in the hope of later French assistance in Italy) and suffered a costly defeat. That is pretty much how he was remembered until recently. 


His reputation has been dusted off and freshened up. His portrait hangs in the antechamber of Putin’s Kremlin office.

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